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Abstract
This paper proposes a new method to infer gender preferences from birth spacing. We
apply it to Africa, where the least is known about gender preferences. We show that son
preference is strong and increasing in North Africa. By contrast, most Sub-Saharan African
countries display a preference for variety or no preference at all. Further analysis concludes
that traditional family systems predict well the nature of gender preferences, while religion
does not. Last, the magnitude of preferences is stronger for wealthier and more educated
women.
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In the early 90s, Sen (1990) coined the term « missing women » to draw attention on
the excess mortality of women in Asia: he estimated that approximately an extra hundred
million women would be there if men and women received similar care in health, medicine,
and nutrition. Since then, a large literature focusing mainly on South Asia and East Asia
has described the discrimination against girls, mentioning for instance sex-selective abortions
(Sen, 2001), differential child mortality (Rose, 1999), or differential health status (Pande,
2003). By contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa appears to do remarkably well. Sex ratios at birth
are close to one, and survival rates as well as health outcomes are generally better for girls
than for boys (Wamani, Astrom, Peterson, Tumwine, & Tylleskar, 2007 ; Anderson & Ray,
2010). All this may explain why gender preferences for children in Sub-Saharan Africa are
rarely studied.
This paper focuses on fertility behavior as an alternative mechanism generating gender
inequality, even when aggregate sex ratios are balanced. In their seminal paper, Ben-Porath
and Welch (1976) infer the existence of gender preferences from the correlation between the
probability to stop having children and the gender composition of existing ones. The idea
has given rise to formal models of differential stopping behavior in favor of sons, predicting
that an average girl has more siblings than an average boy 1 (Jensen, 2005). There might be
important implications for gender inequality because girls would then face more competition
for household resources. 2
On the other hand, the analysis of differential spacing behavior is of special importance
in the African context. Indeed, when couples have many children, gender preferences are
more likely to lead to differences in birth intervals rather than in sibship size. Jensen (2005)
1. As a simple example, consider a population in which parents have only one child if the first-born is a
boy, and have two children if she is a girl. 50% of couples would have one son, 25% one girl and one son, and
25% two girls. Sex ratio is perfectly balanced at the aggregate level, but at the household level, girls have
always one sibling whereas boys have, on average, one third sibling.
2. Differential stopping behavior has been tested and validated by an extensive literature focusing again
on Asia: e.g. Clark (2000), Jensen (2005), and D. Basu and Jong (2010) in India, Abrevaya (2009) in the
Chinese and Asian Indian populations living in the US, and Hatlebakk (2012) in Nepal.
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and D. Basu and Jong (2010) advocate looking at birth intervals to find evidence of gender
preferences in a high-fertility context. Under son preference, differential spacing behavior
implies that an average boy is breastfed longer than an average girl, 3 which may translate
into inequality between boys and girls (Jayachandran & Kuziemko, 2011). Another reason
to consider birth intervals is to account for health risks related to spacing, and not only to
the number of births: according to the medical literature on developing countries, short birth
intervals are associated with adverse outcomes for mothers (Conde-Agudelo & Belizan, 2000)
and children (Conde-Agudelo, Rosas-Bermudez, & Kafury-Goeta, 2006). The authors show
that intervals lower than 24 months multiply the risk of infant death by 2.5, and intervals
lower than 15 months multiply the risk of maternal death by two. If gender preferences turn
out to induce short birth spacing, they could be a significant cause of maternal and infant
mortality in Africa.
In this paper, we propose a new method to infer gender preferences from differential
birth spacing. We use a duration model of birth intervals to test if the gender composition
of previous children influences the duration before the next birth. The main advantage of
duration models is to deal properly with right-censored observations, i.e. families that are
not yet complete by the time of the survey (Leung, 1988, 1991). We infer the existence of son
(resp. daughter) preference when birth spacing is shorter for couples with fewer sons (resp.
fewer daughters) ; and we deduce that preference for variety prevails when couples having a
balanced mix of sons and daughters wait longer than couples having same-sex children. The
conceptual framework underlying this strategy is a unitary model of the couple 4 choosing
3. Again, as a simple example, consider a population in which parents always have two children ; if the
first-born is a girl, they try to have another child immediately, while they wait some time if the first-born is
a boy. First-born girls, who represent half of the female population, are weaned prematurely while the entire
male population is properly breastfed.
4. This is probably a strong assumption given the complexity of marital lives in Africa. In particular, we
do not take into account that children might have different fathers, and that those fathers might also have
children with other women. We will partly address this issue by comparing polygamous and monogamous
women.
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optimal spacing and stopping rules. People might have a taste for balance in the gender
composition of children, or a girl/boy bias ; then, costs and benefits may differ for sons and
daughters. What is labeled as « gender preferences » is the outcome of a decision problem
based on tastes and prices. One caveat of this strategy is that preferences are revealed if and
only if couples have the means to control birth spacing and/or stopping. 5 Using duration
models of birth intervals, son preference has been extensively tested and validated in Asia, 6
but not in Africa. To our knowledge, there is no empirical study based on fertility behavior
that documents systematically the variation in gender preferences in Africa. We contribute
to fill in this gap using Demographic and Health Surveys in 37 African countries.
We find that, in North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt), son preference is strong
and has increased over time. By contrast, in most Sub-Saharan African countries, behavior
is consistent with either preference for variety or no preference. South Africa, in particular,
is characterized by a strong taste for balance. There is weak evidence of son preference
in Mali, Senegal and in the Great Lakes region, but the impact on fertility patterns is
not substantial. We further investigate the role of socioeconomic factors in shaping gender
preferences. Wealthier and more educated women display the same type of preferences as
the others, but the magnitude of their preferences is much larger. Then, in Sub-Saharan
Africa, there is no correlation with religion: Muslims exhibit the same preferences as other
religious groups. On the other hand, traditional kinship structure predicts well the nature of
preferences: son preference prevails in patrilineal ethnic groups only. Last, gender preferences
seem to translate into differential birth spacing mainly through contraception. In North
Africa, modern contraceptive users display a significantly stronger son preference than non-
users. In Sub-Saharan Africa, contraceptive users exhibit preferences for variety whereas we
5. In Section 4.3, we discuss the different mechanisms through which gender preferences may translate
into differential spacing.
6. E.g. in China (Tu, 1991), in Bangladesh (Rahman & DaVanzo., 1993), in the Chinese population of
Malaysia (Pong, 1994), in Vietnam (Haughton & Haughton, 1995), in India (Arnold, Choe, & Roy., 1998),
in South Korea (Larsen, Chung, & Gupta, 1998), and in Taiwan (Tsay & Chu, 2005).
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find no evidence of gender preferences among non-users ; for them, we cannot tell whether
they have no preferences or are not able to translate them into fertility choices.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1 provides background on theoretical
motives for gender preferences and a review of empirical evidence in Africa. Section 2 presents
the data and some descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and the
identification assumptions. The main results are reported in Section 4, and some robustness
tests are described in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1 Gender preferences in Africa
1.1 Theoretical motives for gender preferences
The most important motive put forward by the literature on gender preferences is the
traditional structure of family systems. In patrilineal 7 and patrilocal 8 family systems, men
are the fixed points in the social order, so that investment in daughters is considered as
investment in another family’s daughters-in-law. In Asia, such a system has produced eco-
nomic incentives to have sons. For instance, the money spent for a son’s marriage remains
in the family while the dowry paid for a daughter’s marriage is a net expense. In the same
vein, female labor force participation is only valued once the daughter is adult, hence bene-
fiting the family-in-law. 9 Last, sons act as old age insurance for their parents, because they
are the ones who remain in the family’s house. They also act as widowhood insurance for
their mother, because widows’ claims on the late husband’s resources enjoy a higher social
legitimacy if they have sons (Agarwal, 1994 ; Das Gupta et al., 2003). Mothers, in particular,
really need a son because their status improves substantially when their sons get married:
7. Main assets are passed on through the male line whereas daughters are given movable goods.
8. Upon marriage, wives move to their husbands’ abode.
9. In a context of child labor, son preference decreases when wages increase in the sectors of activity
dedicated to girls (e.g. Koolwal (2007) in Nepal).
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they can exert their power over daughters-in-law. Ultimately, women play a dramatic role
in the perpetuation and reinforcement of patriarchy. Demographers working on Africa have
come to similar conclusions (Lesthaeghe, 1989): among the key factors shaping the repro-
ductive regime in this region, they mention traditional inheritance patterns. In matrilineal
societies, having daughters is necessary to perpetuate the lineage, whereas families need sons
in patrilineal societies. But Africa is different from Asia along at least two dimensions. First,
the system of brideprice prevails in almost all ethnic groups: the groom has to pay for the
bride, contrary to what happens in a system of dowry. Second, the kinship structure is more
flexible: adoptions and exceptions to allow daughters to inherit land in the absence of a
son are not unusual in African patrilineal societies. Eventually, the imperative to have a
biological son is weaker in Africa than in Asia.
Another motive specific to Africa is the depth of Islamic penetration. In North Africa, the
influence of the Islamic law is strong. These societies are characterized by property concen-
tration, endogamous marriages and women seclusion, which implies that women’s security
and status critically depend on their ability to have sons. In Sub-Saharan Africa, traditions
and customs have generally advocated common land ownership, exogamous marriages, wo-
men labor participation and women’s societies, which renders women less dependent on their
sons.(Lesthaeghe, 1989)
The last part of the literature focuses on the impact of modernization factors on gender
preferences ; female education and labor participation, access to modern contraceptives, urba-
nization, economic growth and mass media are the most studied factors. The modernization
hypothesis states that socio-economic development would equalize the value of daughters and
sons to their parents, leading to preferences for variety. However, modernization also brings
about birth control - promoting smaller family size and facilitating sex-selective reproductive
behavior - which could intensify, at least in the short run, traditional gender preferences. So
far, the debate is still open, since empirical studies have found mixed results, depending on
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the context, the indicator, and the empirical specification they look at. 10
1.2 Empirical evidence so far
In her review of the empirical evidence on gender preferences, Fuse (2008) concludes that,
although North Africa has not been subject to much research compared to East or South
Asia, there is evidence of strong gender bias against girls. She further writes that « of all
sub-regions in the world, it appears that the least is known about Sub-Saharan Africa ».
Cross-country analyses generally find evidence of son preference in North Africa, but not
in the rest of the continent (see Arnold (1992) on declared preferences and fertility behavior
and Chakravarty (2012) on breastfeeding duration). Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by
a female advantage in infant mortality (Anderson & Ray, 2010), as well as in nutritional
status and health outcomes (Wamani et al., 2007). It does not display any systematic gender
differences in breastfeeding and health seeking behavior (Garenne, 2003). Regarding declared
preferences, 11 Fuse (2008) reports that most women in this region have no ideal gender com-
position, or would prefer to have the same number of sons and daughters. As for household
resources, Deaton (1987) found no evidence of differential allocation between boys and girls
in Ivory Coast.
Still, some studies show that son preference may appear in Sub-Saharan Africa in case of
income shocks. For instance, Flato and Kotsadam (2014) find that infant mortality increases
more for girls than for boys during a drought ; they further explain that such a difference is
due to discrimination, since the effect is larger in communities more likely to discriminate
10. For instance, modernization factors are associated with smaller son preference in studies on India (Bhat
& Zavier, 2003), Nepal (Barbar & Axinn, 2004), China (Arnold & Liu, 1986 ; Poston, 2002), or Egypt (Vignoli,
2006). But other studies on India (Das Gupta, 1987 ; A. Basu, 1999 ; Rajan, Sudha, & Mohanachandran,
2000 ; Jayachandran, 2014), South Korea (Edlund & Lee, 2013), Egypt (Yount, Langsten, & Hill, 2000) or
Sub-Saharan Africa (Klasen, 1996) have questioned this result.
11. Parents are supposed to have an ideal gender composition of children. Son (resp. daughter) preference
is then defined as the ideal number of sons being strictly greater (resp. lower) than the ideal number of
daughters.
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against daughters (strong declared son preference, preference for a small family size and low
female employment). In the same vein, Friedman and Schady (2012) find that girls are more
exposed than boys to mortality risk in case of aggregate economic shock.
Last, a specific study on Nigeria shows that women with first-born daughters are significantly
more likely to end up in a polygynous union, to be divorced, and to be the head of the
household ; they also have significantly more children (Milazzo, 2014).
Only a few papers estimate duration models of birth intervals in an African context. 12
Gangadharan and Maitra (2003) find evidence of son preference in South Africa, but only
among the Indian community. Anthropologists working on the Gabbra, a patrilineal and
patrilocal society in Kenya, find that women with no son have shorter birth intervals than
women with at least one son (Mace & Sear, 1997). Last, Lambert and Rossi (2014) show
that, in Senegal, women most at risk in case of widowhood substantially shorten birth spacing
until they get a son. They relate son preference to women’s needs for widowhood insurance.
Our paper contributes to the literature using duration models of birth intervals to test
systematically for son preference in Africa. So far, evidence is quite limited in this region.
2 Data
2.1 Data
We use DHS surveys (Demographic and Health Surveys) that were collected from 1986 to
2012 in 37 African countries (surveys listed in Table A.1 in Appendix A). DHS data contain
stratified samples of mothers aged 15 to 49 who are asked about their reproductive history.
DHS data are provided with individual survey weights to ensure that the survey sample is
representative of all mothers at the country level. Nonetheless, sample size of surveys is not
12. Some papers use duration models of birth intervals in Africa, but they are interested in the impact of
socio-economic factors (e.g. mother’s characteristics such as birth cohort, age at first marriage and at first
birth, residence, education in Ghilagaber and Gyimah (2004)), not in son preference.
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proportional to population size. To obtain a representative sample of the 37 African countries
studied, we reweighed the whole sample. 13
The main advantage of these data is that we observe all births, for children either alive
or dead at the time of the survey, and we know the year and month of birth of all children,
which enables us to measure birth intervals in months. Also, surveys are similar across
countries, with a large number of observations (cf. Table A.1 in Appendix A), which allows
a comparative analysis.
Nonetheless, the comparative analysis over space and time based on DHS data has two
limits. On the one hand, surveys are not available in all African countries ; notably Algeria,
Libya, Mauritania, Eritrea, Somalia, Angola and Botswana are missing. Still, our sample
represents 92% of the whole African population in 2009. On the other hand, the surveys
took place during a relatively long period of time, so that by pooling the surveys together,
we are considering different periods in different countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the period
of interest is quite homogeneous: in all countries, the majority of mothers are born in the
60s-70s. This is true also in Egypt, but not in other North countries: in Tunisia, Morocco
and Sudan, most women are born before 1960. 14 We have to keep these caveats in mind
when interpreting cross-country comparisons and time evolutions.
We exploit a second source of data to get information on family systems. We use Mur-
dock’s data on African ethnic groups (Murdock, 1959) coded by Gray (1998) 15 to define
which women belong to a matrilineal ethnic group. We opted for a conservative definition of
matrilinearity, including only those ethnic groups listed by Gray that we found in the DHS
13. Using World Bank population statistics, we compute a sampling rate equal to the number of mothers
in the survey implemented in country j and year i, divided by the total population of country j in year i.
We also correct for the different number of surveys by country.
14. On the other hand, the fact that we do not observe recent cohorts in Morocco and Tunisia makes our
sample more homogeneous: all countries are at a very early stage of the fertility transition.
15. Gray (1998) provides a database that lists the characteristics of African ethnic groups reported by
Murdock. Of particular interest for us is the variable Descent : MajorType that indicates whether an ethnic
group is patrilineal or matrilineal. Table A.2 in Appendix A gives details of our classification and explains
how we matched Gray’s and DHS data.
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data. Patrilinearity is identified by default, and probably includes some matrilineal groups. 16
Such a measurement error in our classification of ethnic groups is likely to flatten the dif-
ferences between matrilineal and patrilineal groups. So when comparing the two categories,
we estimate a lower bound of the difference.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 here
Before estimating the duration model, we provide some descriptive statistics of the non-
censored durations. The upper graph in Figure 1 represents the average birth spacing by
gender composition of the previous children. More precisely, we plot the average duration
between births n and (n + 1) as a function of the proportion of boys among the previous n
children, for n = 1 to 7. At each rank, birth spacing clearly displays an inverted U-shape: 17
it is lower for couples with no son or no daughter, and higher when the sex ratio is balanced.
The maximum is reached by couples having slightly more boys than girls.
We find the same pattern when we look at the stopping behavior (cf. lower graph in
Figure 1). We plot the proportion of women over 40 years old who stopped having children
after the nth birth as a function of the proportion of sons among the previous n children. Here
again, women are more likely to stop having children when they already have a balanced mix
of boys and girls.
In Appendix A, Table A.3 reports some statistics on fertility stopping and spacing be-
haviors, by country. In our sample, women have on average 6.2 children, the average birth
16. We know from Gray (1998) that matrilineal ethnic groups exist in some countries, but the ethnic group
variable was missing in DHS data (e.g. Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Zimbabwe) or DHS data types were too
broad (e.g. DRC) so that we could not identify them.
17. When we regress the non-censored durations on the proportion of boys and the proportion squared,
coefficients are significant and of expected sign, whatever rank we consider. We further plot the lines corres-
ponding to the quadratic regressions on the graph, and they fit quite well.
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interval is 35 months, and one third of birth intervals are shorter than 24 months. But there
is a lot of variation across the continent. Southern African countries stand out because of
long intervals and relatively low numbers of children: less than one fourth of short birth
intervals and approximately four children per woman. The opposite is true for the Sahel
region: between seven and eight children per woman, and more than one third of short birth
intervals. In North Africa, the proportion of short intervals is over 40%, although the number
of children is not that high, between five and six.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 A duration model of birth intervals
As explained in the introduction, we are mainly interested in differential spacing rules.
We use a duration model of birth intervals to infer the existence of gender preferences. Our
variable of interest T is the duration between births n and (n + 1), measured in months,
where n ≥ 1. Our coefficients of interest measure the impact of the gender composition of
previous children on the subsequent birth interval. We estimate a Cox proportional hazard
model (Cox, 1972).
The main reason to prefer duration models to linear models is the issue of censoring:
the former allow us to identify the distribution of a duration variable from potentially right-
censored observations if the duration and the right-censoring variables are independent. This
condition is very likely to be satisfied as the date of the survey is completely unrelated to
the latest births.
An alternative strategy would be to estimate, on the one hand, the probability to have
another child, and on the other hand, the duration before the next birth. In our strategy, we
implicitly assume that the impact of the gender composition on both decisions is the same.
The first reason for this choice is parsimony: we want to build a unique indicator of gender
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preferences, in order to compare it across countries, periods, socio-economic categories etc.
Also, we would have to make some parametric assumptions to separate the stopping and
spacing dimensions, while here, we are able to use a semi-parametric method of estimation.
More importantly, in our context, it is not clear that fertility choices are a two-step decision
process, in which people choose, first, if they want another child, and second, the timing of
the birth. Cohen (1998) shows that couples in Sub-Saharan Africa use contraceptive to delay
births rather than to limit them. If couples have more control over spacing out births than
over stopping them, it may well be the case that they only decide to bring forward or to
delay the next birth. The eventual number of births would then be mechanically determined
by the successive decisions over timing together with the end of the couple’s reproductive
period. 18
3.2 Relating durations to the proportion of sons
We want to design a model that exploits the information on all birth ranks, and not only
intervals after a given rank. To do so, we create a variable Fracn equal to the proportion of
boys among the previous n born children. 19 We model the hazard function at each country
level – the instantaneous probability to have another child at date t – as follows:
λ(t) = λ0(t)× exp(α1.F racn + α2.F rac2n + θ.Xn)
Where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function, common to all individuals, and Xn is a vector
of mother’s characteristics (birth cohort, age at birth n, age at birth n squared, religion,
18. As a robustness test, we also examine differential stopping rules, and as expected, we find much more
scarce evidence of gender preferences (see Appendix B).
19. In Section 5.3, we investigate whether revealed gender preferences differ across ranks. And in Appendix
C, we show that our indicator is not only driven by couples wanting at least one son and/or one daughter,
and that couples having one child of each gender keep displaying gender preferences.
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family system, union type, education, wealth, area of residence, employment status) ; 20 it
also includes a dummy for each rank n, to control for potential differences between birth
orders. In our specification, the unit of observation is not the mother, but the birth. We
reweighed the observations to ensure that each woman counts once, irrespective of her number
of children. 21 We also use robust standard errors clustered at the woman level to account for
the correlation between the error terms related to the different intervals of the same woman.
Under the proportional hazard assumption, eα1+α2 measures the hazard ratio at any point
in time between women having only sons vs. only daughters. If α1 +α2 < 0, having only sons
vs. only daughters decreases the hazard rate and hence increases the expected birth interval.
In this case, we infer the existence of son preference. Conversely, if α1 + α2 > 0, we infer
daughter preference.
Figure 2 here
We introduce the proportion squared to test for a taste for balance in the gender compo-
sition, as illustrated in Figure 2. We plot the multiplier on the baseline hazard as a function
of Frac for different values of α1 and α2. On the top left, we plot the trivial case in which
α1 = α2 = 0, meaning that the gender composition of current children has no impact on
subsequent durations. Then, if α1 < 0 and α2 > 0, it implies that the hazard rate is lower for
women having children of each gender. The lowest hazard rate is reached by women having a
proportion of boys among their children that is exactly equal to − α1
2α2
. Therefore, the longest
duration is predicted to be observed (i) among couples having exactly the same number of
boys and girls if α1 + α2 = 0 (graph on the top right) ; (ii) among couples having sons and
daughters, but more sons than daughters, if α1 + α2 < 0 (graph on the bottom left) ; and
20. We introduce some controls to estimate more precisely the baseline hazard for different categories of
mothers, thus reducing our standard errors. The magnitude of our estimates is unchanged if we remove the
controls.
21. We divide a woman’s individual weight by her number of births. If we do not reweigh the observations,
a woman with n births counts n times. So women having more children, meaning women with a taste for
large families and older women, are over-represented.
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(iii) among couples having sons and daughters, but more daughters than sons, if α1 +α2 > 0
(graph on the bottom right). Our statistic of interest is therefore (α1 + α2).
We define the following classification: 22
– No preference: α1 and α2 are not jointly significant.
– Preference for variety: α1 < 0, α2 > 0 and α1 + α2 = 0.
– Preference for boys: α1 + α2 < 0.
– Preference for girls: α1 + α2 > 0.
3.3 Identification assumptions
The main threat to identification is the prevalence of child mortality. In our sample,
15.7% of children died before turning five years old. In this context, when we analyse fertility
choices, shall we consider the gender composition of the previous births or the gender com-
position of children alive at the time of the decision? There is a trade-off between exogeneity
and relevance. The composition that matters to parents is probably among children who
survived ; but it is correlated to parents’ choices regarding breastfeeding, nutrition and ca-
ring. Indeed, the proportion of sons among survivors could be an outcome of parents’ gender
preferences. That is why we consider the proportion among all births. Our strategy is close to
an instrumental variable framework: we use the composition among births as an instrument
for the composition among survivors, and estimate the reduced form. 23
The first key identification assumption is that there is no sex-selective abortion. We
believe that it is likely to hold because sex ratio at birth in our sample is equal to 51.2%,
which is the ratio observed in Western countries (Brian and Jaisson (2007), Ben-Porath and
22. We do not consider the case α1 > 0, α2 < 0 and α1 + α2 = 0 because we never observe it in our
estimations.
23. Note that we cannot apply a 2SLS procedure because the outcome does not depend linearly on the
instrumented variable. As a robustness check, we do the same analysis using the fraction of sons among
survivors at the time of conception. We compare the indicator α1 + α2 obtained from this analysis to our
main indicator, and we find a very high correlation between the two (0.97). Our conclusion regarding spatial
heterogeneity is unchanged.
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Welch (1976) in the US, Jacobsen, Moller, and Mouritsen (1999) in Denmark) and generally
considered as the natural level. Moreover, abortions are rare in Africa. Abortion is allowed
without restriction only in Tunisia and in South Africa (United Nations, 2011b). According
to recent estimations including illegal abortions, the number of abortions per 100 live births
is 17 in Africa, compared to 34 in Asia and 59 in Europe (Sedgh, Henshaw, Singh, Ahman,
& Shah, 2007). Last, sex-selective abortions are even less likely in our context, as obstetric
ultrasound is not so common. Today, only 30% of women in cities, and 6% of women in rural
areas have access to ultrasound during their pregnancy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Carrera,
2011).
The second identification assumption is that there is no sex-selective child mortality. 24
Otherwise, the coefficients in the reduced form capture both the reaction to the death of
a child and the « true » impact of gender composition on the next birth. In our sample,
boys tend to die more than girls: for 100 girls dying before age five, 111 under-five boys
die. This figure is 112 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 105 in North Africa, and it is above 100 in
every country. 25 Consequently, families with more sons at birth are more likely to have lost
one child. If parents intensify fertility after the death of a child, we would observe that
families with more sons have shorter birth intervals. So we would tend to underestimate
son preference and to overestimate daughter preference everywhere. 26 If we find evidence of
son preference, it has to be driven by fertility choices. Sex-selective mortality alone could
explain our results only if we conclude that daughter preference prevails. Another question
is whether the variation across countries arises mainly from the variation in sex-selective
24. Sex-selective adult mortality could also bias our estimates if parents form beliefs about the survival
probability of their sons and daughters at adult age, and take fertility decisions according to these beliefs.
However, qualitative evidence provided by demographers do not support the idea that people make such
calculations about child loss (Randall & LeGrand, 2003).
25. Such a female advantage in mortality is observed in most countries in the world, with the notable
exception of India and China. The average world ratio excluding India and China was around 111 during
the last decades (United Nations, 2011a).
26. Since differential mortality is the lowest in North Africa, it is the region in which son preference would
be less underestimated.
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mortality. In Section 5.1, we test if our sorting of countries is robust to a potential mortality
bias by focusing on parents who lost no child.
Another threat to our strategy is that the prevalence of maternal mortality could lead
to sample selection. In particular, if mothers exhibiting specific gender preferences are more
likely to die, surviving women would be selected. For instance, suppose that mothers with
the strongest son preference shorten birth intervals when they have only girls, increasing
their exposure to maternal mortality risk. These women would be under-represented, and
our estimate of son preference for surviving mothers would underestimate son preference in
the whole population. Conversely, in a daughter preference setting, we would underestimate
daughter preference. So selective maternal mortality might lead to underestimating gender
preferences. 27 In our data, we can get indirect evidence of selective maternal mortality by
looking at the sex ratio of the first born child. In our sample, the ratio is around 0.51 in
all countries, but we do find that in some countries, it increases (up to 0.57 in Nigeria), or
decreases (down to 0.45 in Sudan) for older women. This is a hint that maternal mortality
may be linked to gender preferences in different ways for different countries. We estimate an
order of magnitude of the selection bias in Section 5.2.
4 Results
4.1 Comparative descriptive analysis
4.1.1 Heterogeneity over space
Figure 3 here
Figure 3 maps the magnitude of our indicator of gender preferences (α1+α2) for countries
27. Note that another mechanism could lead to the same bias: if mothers having preferences for sons are
more likely to forget first-born girls who died in their first days of life than first-born boys, this sex-selective
recall would also lead to an underestimation of gender preferences.
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in which α1 and α2 are jointly significant. Otherwise, countries are classified as « no prefe-
rence ». 28 We find evidence of son preference in North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt),
Mali and Senegal, and also in the Great Lakes region (Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Mozam-
bique, Tanzania). Then, Southern Africa (Namibia and South Africa) is characterized by a
preference for variety, and Central Africa (Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Congo DRC, Gabon,
Central African Republic) by the absence of revealed gender preferences. In the rest of the
continent, countries are divided into no gender preferences (Swaziland, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo, Niger, Sudan, Zambia, Lesotho and Madagascar, Cote d’Ivoire)
and a taste for balance (Guinea, Liberia, Benin, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Malawi and Zimbabwe).
No country displays daughter preference.
Such a simple sorting fails to give a sense of magnitude. When we predict the size of
our coefficients α1 and α2 in a cross-country regression, they increase with the proportion
of Muslims and with the prevalence of contraception. 29 Then, we want to estimate by how
much gender preferences impact fertility choices. We compute the predicted median birth
spacing and the probability of short birth spacing (≤ 24 months) 30 for (i) couples with no
son ; (ii) couples with no daughter ; and (iii) couples having the optimal mix of sons and
daughters. 31 Estimations are reported in Table 1 for countries in which we found evidence
of gender preferences ; examining the magnitude is indeed meaningless when the proportion
of sons has no significant impact on subsequent births.
Table 1 here
North African countries stand out because they display the largest magnitudes: for ins-
tance, in Egypt, having no son is predicted to reduce the median birth spacing by three
28. The classification of countries can also be found in Appendix D in Table A.6.
29. Since contraceptive use is correlated with wealth and total fertility, we also find that the magnitude of
preferences increases in wealth and decreases in the number of children per woman.
30. In the Cox model, one can derive an estimate of the survival function Ŝ(t) (Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones, 2004). The predicted median birth spacing is τ s.t. Ŝ(τ) = 0.5 and the probability of short birth
spacing is Ŝ(24).
31. The optimal mix is the fraction of sons corresponding to the lowest hazard rate ; it is equal to − α12α2 .
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months as compared to having no daughter, and by five months as compared to the opti-
mal mix of sons and daughters. Having no daughter (respectively having the optimal mix)
decreases by 13% (respectively by 20%) the probability to have short birth intervals, compa-
red to having no son. There, son preference has a strong impact on fertility patterns. Large
magnitudes are also observed in South Africa. When the gender composition is perfectly
balanced, couples are predicted to wait seven months more than couples having only boys or
only girls. The taste for balance therefore translates into sizeable differences between families.
In the rest of Africa, gender preferences have a much weaker impact. Should they display
preferences for boys or for variety, all countries exhibit very small differences in predicted
birth spacing across our three categories of interest (zero or one month). In case of son pre-
ference, having only sons decreases by roughly 4% the probability of short birth spacing as
compared to having only daughters.
4.1.2 Heterogeneity over time
To study the evolution of gender preferences over time, we interact our variables of interest
with the mother’s birth cohort in the general model:
λ(t) = λ0(t)× exp(λ1.cohort+ λ2.cohort2 + ζ1.F racn + ζ2.F rac2n + φ1.cohort.Fracn +
φ2.cohort
2.F racn + ω1.cohort.Frac
2
n + ω2.cohort
2.F rac2n + θ.Xn + κ.C)
We pool all the surveys together, adding a vector of dummies for each country (C) to our
main specification. From the estimates, we compute an indicator of cohort-by-cohort gender
preference:
P̂ ref = ζ̂1 + ζ̂2 + φ̂1.cohort+ φ̂2.cohort
2 + ω̂1.cohort+ ω̂2.cohort
2
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Considering birth spacing rather than completed fertility allows us to look at contemporary
cohorts, because we already have information about the behavior of women born in the 70s
and 80s.
Figure 4 here
In Figure 4 we plot P̂ ref against the birth cohort, together with its 5% confidence
intervals, in North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our indicator is more and more negative
over time in North Africa, meaning that son preference increases. When we break down this
trend by country, we find that it is mainly driven by Egypt, especially in the most recent years.
As explained in Section 2.1, we have few mothers born after 1970 in Morocco and Tunisia.
Before that date, the trend observed in Morocco is similar to the Egyptian one, whereas it
is rather flat in Tunisia – if anything, son preference tends to decrease. The reinforcement of
son preference in North Africa coincide with fertility transitions, supporting the idea that a
reduction in family size exacerbates gender preferences.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, there is not much variation: our indicator is fairly stable across
the period. It is slightly increasing during the first decades, but the magnitude of the change
is small and imprecisely estimated. For most cohorts, P̂ ref is not significantly different from
zero, so there is no evidence of son preference.
4.2 Key drivers of gender preferences
Now that we have underscored different patterns in Sub-Saharan and in North Africa,
one may wonder if socio-economic factors drive some heterogeneity within these areas. In
this section, we examine whether preferences vary across categories of women (e.g. educated
vs. non-educated, rural vs. urban, matrilineal vs. patrilineal etc.).
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4.2.1 Empirical strategy
We introduce interaction terms in our specification:
λ(t) = λ0(t)× exp(γ0.Alter + γ1.F racn + γ2.F rac2n + δ1.F racn.Alter + δ2.F rac2n.Alter + θ.Xn + κ.C)
Where Alter is a dummy equal to 0 if women belong to the reference category, and 1 if they
belong to the alternative category. Again, we pool all the surveys together, and we add country and
cohort dummies. Then, for each category, we compute our indicator of gender preference (using the
notations of the general specification, it corresponds to α1 + α2):
– Reference category: we test if γ1 + γ2 = 0
– Alternative category: we test if γ1 + γ2 + δ1 + δ2 = 0
We can conclude that gender preferences are different between the two categories if δ1 + δ2 is
significantly different from 0.
4.2.2 Are religion and family systems shaping preferences?
We start by considering two structural factors that appeared in the literature review as potential
drivers of gender preferences: Islamic influence and traditional kinship structure. We can only
perform this analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa, because the number of Christians and matrilineal
group members is too low in North Africa.
Table 2 here
The first hypothesis we want to test is whether son preference is stronger among Muslims. The
depth of Islamic penetration is indeed one way to explain the difference between North and Sub-
Saharan African countries. The next question is whether, in Sub-Saharan Africa, Muslims and other
religious groups have different preferences. In the first column of Table 2, we show that Muslims
exhibit the same taste for balance as Christians and animists. Coefficients on the interaction terms
are not significant, and the indicator of gender preferences is the same in both categories. So religion
may play a role at the macro level, by influencing family law, property rights, social norms etc.,
but in a given institutional setting, it does not seem to drive individual gender preferences.
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The second hypothesis is that son preference would prevail in patrilineal ethnic groups, while
daughter preference should be observed in matrilineal groups. As shown in Table 2, column 2, this
hypothesis is validated: we find that our indicator of gender preferences is negative in patrilineal
groups, which means son preference ; whereas it is positive in matrilineal groups, although not
significant. Given the small proportion of the sample belonging to a matrilineal group (5.7%),
we lack some power to take a definitive stance, but matrilineal groups seem to exhibit daughter
preference. In any case, their preferences are significantly different from the ones in patrilineal
groups.
When we further split the sample on the median wealth index, we find that our result on kinship
structure is driven by relatively rich people. In the poorest half of the sample, couples in patrilineal
and matrilineal groups exhibit the same preferences. One interpretation might be that inheritance
rules impact gender preferences only when families have enough assets to bequest.
In the third column of Table 2, we test if gender preferences differ across union types: polygamous
vs. monogamous. We find preference for variety in monogamous unions, but no evidence of gender
preferences in polygamous unions. For them, the coefficients on Frac and Frac2 are very close
to zero. Given the caveat that we mentioned in the introduction, this result is not surprising: our
unitary model is well-suited to monogamous households, but it is less adequate to describe choices
in more complex household structures.
4.2.3 How do preferences relate to modernization?
Now, we turn to the modernization hypothesis, and examine individual indicators of develop-
ment. Table 3 reports the results for Sub-Saharan Africa in the upper part, and for North Africa
in the lower part. More precisely, we compare the poorest half and the richest half of the sample
(column 1) ; non-working and working women (column 2) ; women who do and do not use contracep-
tion (column 3) ; non-educated and educated women (column 4) ; rural and urban women (column
5) ; each time controlling for all other socioeconomic variables.
Table 3 here
Starting with Sub-Saharan Africa, we first find that wealth intensifies gender preferences, but
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has no impact on the preferred proportion of sons. In the richest half of the sample, coefficients on
Frac and Frac2 are both significantly larger in absolute terms than in the poorest half ; but the
indicator of preferences for boys vs. girls is the same and reveals preferences for variety. Wealth
seems to strengthen the taste for balance, modifying the magnitude, but not the nature of gender
preferences. While the same findings hold, to a smaller extent, for education, we find no correlation
between gender preferences and the area of residence controlling for education, wealth, employment
status and contraceptive use.
The second result is that son preference is very strong for women who do not work, whereas
working mothers exhibit preferences for variety. One explanation emphasizes insurance motives for
the mother: non-working women are heavily dependent on their husband, and in case of widowhood,
on their sons. The prevalence of son preference among non-working mothers also holds in matrilineal
groups, suggesting that the insurance motive might prevail over the lineage motive.
Last, the correlation with contraceptive use is in line with expectations. Here, the variable
Contraception is equal to one if the woman uses a modern method of contraception at the time
of the survey. It does not imply that she was using it during her whole birth history, but it is a
good proxy for how much control she has over fertility choices. For women who do not use modern
contraceptives, coefficients on Frac and Frac2 are close to zero: the gender composition of previous
children does not influence subsequent birth intervals. Either they have no gender preferences, or
they lack control over fertility to translate their preferences into actions.
Turning to North Africa, we find evidence of a strong son preference in every category we
consider. Here again, the magnitude of preferences is much larger in more ”modern” categories. But
the nature of preferences is not substantially affected. The only difference arises with contraception:
modern contraceptive users display a significantly stronger son preference than non-users.
4.3 Mechanisms: individual choices or social norms?
The fact that contraceptive use is correlated with revealed preferences raises the question of
the mechanisms: how may gender preferences translate into differential spacing behavior? The first
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channel we have in mind is a conscious choice made by the couple to bring forward or to delay the
next birth in order to reach an ideal gender composition. This requires that couples use birth control
methods, be it modern contraceptives or more traditional methods such as varying breastfeeding
duration. Another channel deserves attention: there might be social norms surrounding birth spacing
practices that produce differential spacing. We think in particular of breastfeeding norms that
require children of one gender to be fed longer than others. 32 Such norms might reveal gender
preferences at the society level. But in an evolutionary perspective, they might also simply reflect
the greater biological vulnerability of one gender in the first years of life, and the attempt to reach
a balanced sex ratio at reproductive ages.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the modern contraceptive channel affects a limited fraction of the popu-
lation. According to the United Nations, the contraception prevalence in Sub-Saharan Africa was
25% in 2011, and 20% if we focus on modern contraceptive methods. As a comparison, the same fi-
gures in Asia were 67% and 61% (United Nations, 2012). The limited contraception prevalence may
partly explain why we find no differential spacing in most Sub-Saharan countries. Those women
who have access to contraception clearly reveal preferences for variety, as shown by Table 3. This
result points to a deliberate manipulation of birth intervals. Regarding breastfeeding practices, as
already mentioned in the literature review, they do not differ by gender (Chakravarty, 2012 ; Ga-
renne, 2003). The equal treatment in breastfeeding might reflect the absence of gender preferences
at both individual and social levels.
In North Africa, a larger share of the population uses modern contraceptive methods: the
contraception prevalence was 48% in 2011 (United Nations, 2012). As already shown in earlier
studies (Yount et al., 2000), contraceptive use depends on the gender composition of earlier births.
In our sample, the proportion of women using modern birth control methods is significantly lower
(by 1.7 percentage points) after the birth of a girl as compared to a boy. Therefore, the shorter birth
intervals observed in families with more daughters are partly generated by different contraceptive
choices. This is a first hint that our strategy captures intentional choices. As for breastfeeding
32. Since breastfeeding duration is correlated to the duration of postpartum insusceptibility, such norms
may generate systematic differences in birth intervals after the birth of a son vs. a girl (Jayachandran &
Kuziemko, 2011).
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practices, they differ by gender only in Egypt, where we find that boys are significantly more likely
than girls to be breastfed longer than 15 months (by two percentage points). This result is in line
with Chakravarty (2012) and may originate from individual choices as well as from social norms.
We attempt to disentangle both dimensions by decomposing our variable Fracn into Fracn−1: the
proportion of sons among the previous (n−1) births, and Boyn: a dummy indicating whether the nth
birth is a boy. Results for North Africa are reported in Table A.7 in Appendix E. The proportion of
sons among the previous (n−1) births has an impact on the duration between births n and (n+1):
we find the same asymmetric U-shape as with Fracn. It indicates that parents take into account
the gender composition of their whole family. Parents also react to the gender of the latest born:
the coefficient on Boysn is negative and significant, which may reflect conscious or less conscious
choices. One argument in favor of conscious choices is that the impact of Boysn differs across birth
orders: it is stronger at ranks three and four than at other ranks. Such a pattern is difficult to
reconcile with a breastfeeding norm. All in all, we believe that differential spacing should be mainly
interpreted as a reflection of conscious, individual choices. Social norms surrounding breastfeeding
may also play a role, but the body of evidence seems to indicate that it is limited.
5 Robustness Tests
5.1 Testing the child mortality bias
As mentioned in Section 3.3, we test if sex-selective mortality introduces a bias in our estimates.
The idea is to isolate couples who lost at least one child among the previous n births, and to focus
on couples who lost no child. If we find evidence of gender preferences for the latter, they cannot be
driven by differential mortality, they have to be driven by differential fertility rules. In Table A.8 in
Appendix E, we interact Frac and Frac2 with a dummy equal to one if at least one of the previous
n children died. As expected, we find that the sex-selective mortality leads us to underestimate the
extent of son preference in Africa: our indicator (α1 + α2) is more negative among women who did
not lose any children than in the baseline. However, the difference is small, around 10%. Then, we
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check if our baseline classification of countries into the « son preference group » and the « preference
for variety group » remains valid. In Table A.9 in Appendix E, we find, again, that focusing on
couples who lost no child slightly shifts our results towards more son preference. However, (α1 +α2)
remains not significantly different from zero in the group classified as « preferences for variety »,
implying that our findings are robust.
To better understand the magnitude of the bias, we compute the predicted median birth spacing
and the probability of stopping for couples who did not lose a child. In absolute values, birth spacing
increases by one month, and the probability of stopping by roughly one percentage point, compared
to the magnitudes discussed in section 4.1. But in relative terms, the differences across categories
remain very stable.
The last test is to look how our sorting of countries is affected by mortality. Going on with
same specification, we compute (α1 + α2) among people who lost no child in each country, and
compare it to our baseline (α1 + α2). The correlation between both indicators is 0.97. Then, we
sort the countries according to each indicator, and the rank correlation is equal to 0.95. In the end,
the variation in sex-selective mortality across countries does not seem to drive the variation we
observe. 33
5.2 Testing the sample selection of mothers
We further deal with a potential selection bias. We run our model on mothers below 40 years old
who are less likely to have died or forgotten their earlier-born children. 34 For this sample of younger
mothers, we find that the gender of the first born is exogenous to socioeconomic characteristics,
which supports the assumption that the sample is not selected. We find that the correlation between
the indicator computed on younger mothers and our baseline indicator is 0.94. Furthermore, the
rank correlation between both classifications is 0.88. These strong correlations supports the idea
that our results are not driven by differences between countries in maternal mortality or recall bias.
33. Another piece of evidence is given by the low rank correlation (0.16) between our sorting and the
sorting of countries on the child mortality ratio between girls and boys.
34. Results not shown, but available on request.
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Last, we checked, as in Table A.9, that our classification of countries into « preference for son » and
« preference for variety » remains robust once we restrict our sample to younger mothers.
One limit if this strategy is that maternal mortality affects also young women. In particular,
one can fear that when we find no gender preferences in some countries, it might be due to the
fact that women having stronger son preference massively died before 40 years old. Let us consider
simple back of the envelope calculations to get an order of magnitude of such a downward bias. In
countries classified as « no preference », let us assume that there are in fact two groups of women.
The first one, accounting for M% of the population, has very strong son preference ; we attribute
to them the largest magnitude found in our sample (α1 +α2 = −0.17 in Egypt). The second group
has no gender preference ; for them, α1 = α2 = 0. The scenario that would lead to the most extreme
selection bias is that all women having a son preference die, while all women having no preference
survive. In this case, M represents the mortality rate. Following our baseline strategy, we would
only observe surviving women and compute an indicator of gender preferences equal to 0, whereas
the true indicator for the whole population would be around −0.17×M . 35 These countries could
therefore reach the lowest magnitude of son preference observed in our sample (α1 +α2 = −0.04 in
Senegal) if they had a maternal mortality rate at least equal to M = 0.040.17 = 23.5%. It amounts to a
lifetime risk of one out of four, a magnitude never reached in Sub-Saharan Africa. 36 To conclude,
maternal mortality would need to reach unlikely high levels in order to drive our « no preference »
results.
5.3 Investigating heterogenous effects across birth ranks
In our model, we pooled all birth ranks together to have more power and to build a single
indicator of gender preferences. But some papers in the literature on India have discussed the hete-
rogeneous effect of gender preferences across birth ranks. For instance, Jayachandran and Kuziemko
35. Under the technical assumption that the weighted average of our indicator in both groups is a good
proxy for the global indicator.
36. By comparison, it is almost ten times higher than the average risk in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2013 (one
out of 38), and four times larger than the largest risk (one out of 15 in Chad) (WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA
and The World Bank, 2014).
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(2011) show that the impact of son preference is stronger at higher ranks, when parents get closer to
their ideal family size. On the other hand, family size itself may influence preferences: Jayachandran
(2014) finds that son preference increases when families get smaller.
Our strategy might easily be modified to investigate whether the impact of gender preferences
differs across birth ranks in Africa. 37 We estimate a model similar to Section 4.1.2: we interact
our variables of interest with the child’s birth rank, and we compute a rank-by-rank indicator. In
Figure A.1, in Appendix E, we plot this indicator together with its 5% confidence intervals in North
Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Both graphs display a U-shape, meaning that son preference is
the strongest between ranks three and six. At lower and higher ranks, it is much weaker in North
Africa, and disappears in Sub-Saharan Africa.
There are three ways to explain this pattern. First, the intensity of gender preferences, for the
same couple, may vary across birth orders. It could be low at lowest ranks, because parents still have
time for other tries in the future. Then the intensity could increase as time passes by, and parents
start worrying about the eventual gender composition of their children. Last, the trend could revert
at highest ranks if parents can already count on their eldest children. Second, the ability to control
fertility, and hence to translate preferences into differential spacing, may be higher at intermediary
ranks. Indeed, at lowest ranks, contraceptive use is less widespread ; and at highest ranks, biological
fecundity is lower, which reduces women’s leeway. The last explanation is that gender preferences
may be heterogenous across couples depending on the family size. Such a U-shape is consistent with
(i) preference for variety in small size families, (ii) son preference in middle size families, and (iii)
no preference in large size families. 38
These results raise some concern about the implicit assumption in our model that birth orders
have a multiplicative effect on the baseline hazard. To remove any doubt, we estimated our model
rank by rank, for each country. We retrieved coefficients α1 and α2 for each rank, and we computed
a weighted average, taking into account the number of observations at each rank. We were thus
able to build a new indicator of gender preferences for each country, and we checked that it was
37. In Appendix F, we focus on the situation after the second birth.
38. When we interact Frac and Frac2 with family size instead of birth order (using the subsample of
women over 40 years old), we also find a U-shape, which provides support for this explanation.
27
strongly correlated to our baseline indicator (0.86). The restriction we made on birth order effects
in our main specification does not change qualitatively our results.
6 Conclusion
All in all, we find robust evidence that son preference influences fertility patterns in North Africa:
people tend to shorten birth spacing and to have additional children as long as they have not had
enough sons. This has strong implications for gender inequality: an average girl would be weaned
sooner, and would face more competition from her siblings, than an average boy. Moreover, women,
as mothers, would put their own lives in jeopardy to ensure that enough sons are born. Policies
aiming at reducing women’s reliance on sons, or equalizing the value of sons and daughters to their
parents, could weaken the motives for son preference. Ultimately, they could help lengthening birth
intervals and improving maternal and child health in North Africa.
We cannot draw the same conclusion for Sub-Saharan Africa: son preference exists in some
countries, but it is weak. Overall, fertility behavior is rather consistent with a preference for variety
or no preference at all. The impact of gender preferences on fertility patterns is not substantial
enough to induce gender inequality. In this context, policies combating son preference will not be
enough to curb fertility.
We also showed that differential spacing mainly reflects conscious choices, implemented through
contraception, rather than social norms related to breastfeeding. In the likely scenario that some
women still have unmet needs for family planning, our results suggest that gender preferences may
deepen in the short run. The rise in contraceptive use might exacerbate son preference in North
Africa and preference for variety in Sub-Saharan Africa, provided that current contraceptive users
reveal preferences that are shared by the whole population. In the longer run, the evolution of gender
preferences depends on more structural changes that could impact the nature of preferences, for
instance through women empowerment.
The dissimilarity between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa can certainly be explained by
structural differences in women’s role in society. Yet, we are not claiming that gender inequality
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is only an issue in North Africa, but not in Sub-Saharan Africa. There are plenty of mechanisms
by which gender preferences prevailing in a society may translate into inequality, beginning with
family law and property rights. On many dimensions, it might be argued that women do have
a subordinate status in Sub-Saharan Africa. Anderson and Ray (2010) show that, in this region,
there are « missing women », too. But contrary to India and China, they are in majority of adult
age ; HIV/AIDS and maternal deaths are the two main sources of female excess mortality. The
discrimination against women would appear later in life: at puberty? At marriage? At motherhood?
At widowhood? Understanding when and why remains an open question.
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Figure 1: Descriptive statistics on non-censored observations
 
 
 
Average duration between births n and (n+ 1) (upper graph) and proportion of women who stopped having
children after the nth birth (lower graph) as a function of the proportion of boys among the previous n
children. Fitted values correspond to values predicted by a quadratic regression. n = 1 to 7 because at
higher ranks, there are too few observations for each possible value of the proportion of boys. Lower graph:
women over 40 years old to mitigate the issue of right-censoring.
36
Figure 2: Multiplier on the baseline hazard as a function of the proportion of sons
Preference for variety:
α1<0; α2>0; α1+α2=0exp(α1.Frac+α2.Frac²)
No preference:
α1=α2=0exp(α1.Frac+α2.Frac²)
1
‐α1/2α2
0 1
Frac1
0 1
Frac
Son preference: Daughter preference:
α1+α2<0exp(α1.Frac+α2.Frac²)
 
α1+α2>0exp(α1.Frac+α2.Frac²)
1
‐α1/2α2
0 1
Frac 1
‐α1/2α2
0 1
Frac
exp(α1.F rac+ α2.F rac
2): multiplier on the baseline hazard.
Frac: proportion of sons among earlier births.
Each graph is calibrated for different values of α1 and α2 which are meant to represent an archetype of
gender preferences. The lowest hazard rate, and therefore the longest duration, is predicted to be observed
when Frac = −α12α2 . We infer the nature of gender preferences by comparing this point to one half, which
boils down the comparing α1 + α2 to zero.
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Figure 3: Gender preferences by country
Magnitude of our indicator (α1 + α2)
	

	







Missing data
Son Preference
The map relates to our classification in the following way:
– No preference: α1 and α2 are not jointly significant.
– Son preference: α1 + α2 significantly negative.
– Preference for variety: α1 + α2 not significantly different from zero.
– Daughter preference (empty category): α1 + α2 significantly positive.
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Figure 4: The evolution of (α1 + α2) over time
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Order 2 polynomial of mother’s birth cohort with 5% confidence intervals. Cox estimation. Standard errors
clustered at the mother level. Weights. Controls: country, rank of preceding birth, and mother’s charac-
teristics: age at preceding birth, religion, family system, union type, education, wealth, area of residence,
employment status.
Beware that the scale is not the same in the two graphs.
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Table 1: Magnitude of gender preferences across countries
Predicted median birth Probability of short
spacing (in months) intervals (≤ 24 months)
No son No daughter Optimal mix No son No daughter Optimal mix
Countries displaying son preference
Egypt 29 32 34 35.4% 30.9% 28.5%
Tunisia 27 28 31 39.5% 36.5% 32.5%
Burundi 30 30 30 28.7% 27.1% 27.1%
Kenya 28 29 29 33.6% 32.1% 31.4%
Uganda 26 27 27 37.8% 36.2% 36.0%
Mali 27 27 28 35.9% 34.5% 33.8%
Mozambique 33 33 33 23.7% 22.7% 22.5%
Morocco 24 25 26 46.6% 45.0% 41.8%
Tanzania 33 33 33 22.5% 21.8% 21.4%
Senegal 30 31 31 27.7% 26.8% 26.8%
Countries displaying preferences for variety
Zimbabwe 35 36 36 18.8% 18.4% 17.8%
Rwanda 28 28 29 34.0% 33.4% 32.1%
Guinea 33 33 34 22.9% 22.6% 20.7%
Malawi 33 33 34 22.1% 21.9% 21.3%
Namibia 35 35 36 23.1% 23.0% 21.9%
South Africa 58 58 65 13.5% 13.6% 12.2%
Benin 33 33 34 22.0% 22.3% 20.9%
Ethiopia 30 30 31 29.4% 29.7% 28.7%
Liberia 26 25 26 41.6% 42.4% 39.9%
We use the survival function and the parameters estimated in the Cox model. The optimal mix is the
proportion of sons corresponding to the lowest predicted hazard rate ; it is equal to − α12α2 .
The predicted median birth spacing and the probability of short birth spacing are computed for the median
individual in each country.
We sort the countries according to the magnitude of our indicator of gender preferences (α1 +α2) (cf. Table
A.6 in Appendix). We do not provide estimations for countries displaying no gender preferences, because the
question of the magnitude makes no sense in this case.
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Table 2: Testing the impact of religion and family system in Sub-Saharan Africa
Reference category Christians and animists Patrilineal Monogamous
Alternative category Muslims Matrilineal Polygamous
frac(γ1) -0.131
∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.026) (0.031)
frac2(γ2) 0.119
∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.025) (0.030)
frac× Alter(δ1) -0.041 0.248∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.059) (0.052)
frac2 × Alter(δ2) 0.048 -0.216∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.056) (0.049)
(γ1 + γ2) -0.013 -0.011
∗ -0.013
(γ1 + γ2 + δ1 + δ2) -0.006 0.021 0.001
Pvalue test (δ1 + δ2) = 0 0.65 0.10 0.51
Observations 2615663 2718999 2283793
Dependent variable: duration between births n and (n + 1). frac: proportion of boys among the previous n children. Alter:
dummy for alternative category. Cox estimation, no hazard ratio. Standard errors clustered at the mother level. ***Significant
at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent level. Weights. Controls: country,
rank of preceding birth, and mother’s characteristics: birth cohort, age at preceding birth, religion, family system, union type,
education, wealth, area of residence, employment status, contraceptive use.
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Table 3: Testing the impact of modernization factors
Reference category Poorest half No education Not working No contraception Rural
Alternative category Richest half Education Working Contraception Urban
Panel A: Sub-Saharan Africa
frac(γ1) -0.080
∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗ 0.002 -0.159∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.028) (0.029)
frac2(γ2) 0.072
∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ -0.011 0.148∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027)
frac×Alter(δ1) -0.243∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.950∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.047) (0.042) (0.041) (0.051) (0.047)
frac2 ×Alter(δ2) 0.239∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ -0.023
(0.044) (0.039) (0.038) (0.047) (0.044)
(γ1 + γ2) -0.008 -0.007 -0.019
∗∗ -0.009 -0.010
(γ1 + γ2 + δ1 + δ2) -0.011 -0.012 - 0.003 -0.017 -0.010
Pvalue test (δ1 + δ2) = 0 0.80 0.74 0.22 0.63 0.96
Observations 2446170 2717402 2716216 2718999 2718999
Panel B: North Africa
frac(γ1) -0.010 -0.157*** -0.681*** 0.496*** -0.435***
(0.068) (0.043) (0.035) (0.048) (0.042)
frac2(γ2) -0.128** 0.027 0.541*** -0.614*** 0.281***
(0.063) (0.040) (0.033) (0.045) (0.039)
frac×Alter(δ1) -1.523*** -1.514*** -1.082*** -2.437*** -0.796***
(0.079) (0.057) (0.081) (0.055) (0.057)
frac2 ×Alter(δ2) 1.482*** 1.488*** 1.072*** 2.379*** 0.825***
(0.073) (0.053) (0.075) (0.051) (0.053)
(γ1 + γ2) -0.137*** -0.130*** -0.140*** -0.118*** -0.154***
(γ1 + γ2 + δ1 + δ2) -0.179*** -0.155*** - 0.149*** -0.175*** -0.126***
Pvalue test (δ1 + δ2) = 0 0.10 0.15 0.69 0.00 0.11
Observations 209775 385033 385177 385180 385180
Dependent variable: duration between births n and (n + 1). frac: proportion of boys among the previous n children. Alter:
dummy for alternative category. Cox estimation, no hazard ratio. Standard errors clustered at the mother level. ***Significant
at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent level. Weights. Controls: country,
rank of preceding birth, and mother’s characteristics: birth cohort, age at preceding birth, religion, family system, union type,
education, wealth, area of residence, employment status, contraceptive use.
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Appendix: For online publication
Appendix A: Additional information on data
Table A.1: Survey waves and years
Country Survey years Nb births Nb women
Benin 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 143,141 35,210
Burkina Faso 1992, 1998, 2003, 2010 140,428 32,396
Burundi 1987, 2010 36,406 8,731
Congo Dem. Rep. 2007 29,548 7,148
Cameroon 1991, 1998, 2004, 2011 98,566 25,266
Central African Rep. 1994 16,936 4,388
Chad 1996, 2004 47,187 10,508
Rep. of the Congo 2005, 2011 48,635 13,339
Cote d’Ivoire 1994, 1998, 2011 60,656 15,654
Egypt 1988, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008 294,830 76,897
Ethiopia 2000, 2005 129,113 30,263
Gabon 2000, 2012 39,987 10,882
Ghana 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 67,676 17,748
Guinea 1999, 2005, 2012 77,741 18,622
Kenya 1989, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 117,031 28,606
Lesotho 2004, 2009 29,137 10,023
Liberia 1986, 2007 39,387 9,932
Madagascar 1992, 1997, 2003, 2008 109,847 28,417
Malawi 1992, 2000, 2004, 2010 164,935 41,394
Mali 1987, 1995, 2001, 2006 150,720 32,570
Morocco 1987, 1992, 2003 80,669 18,970
Mozambique 1997, 2003, 2011 101,179 27,154
Namibia 1992, 2000, 2006 47,840 15,126
Niger 1992, 1998, 2006, 2012 131,290 27,403
Nigeria 1990, 1999, 2003, 2008 179,246 40,960
Rwanda 1992, 2005, 2010 82,151 19,838
Senegal 1986, 1992, 1997, 2005, 2011 144,101 33,956
Sierra Leone 2008 21,136 5,876
South Africa 1998 22,934 8,223
Sudan 1989 25,805 5,277
Swaziland 2006 11,410 3,488
Tanzania 1991, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2010 126,319 30,830
Togo 1988, 1998 37,051 8,825
Tunisia 1988 16,463 3,856
Uganda 1988, 1995, 2000, 2006, 2011 120,935 27,339
Zambia 1992, 1996, 2001, 2007 92,092 22,423
Zimbabwe 1988, 1994, 1999, 2005, 2010 82,134 24,606
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Table A.2: Matrilineal ethnic groups: matching the Ethnographic Atlas and DHS data
Ethnic group in Gray (1998) Country Year of Code in Comment
DHS survey DHS survey
Dorosie / Voltaic people Burkina Faso Not listed in DHS
Lobi / Voltaic people Burkina Faso 1992, 1998, 2003, 2010 6
Tuareg Burkina Faso 1992, 1998, 2003, 2010 9
Udalan / Plateu Nigerians - Chadic Burkina Faso Not listed in DHS
Fur / Darfur Chad Not listed in DHS
Sundi / Central Bantu, basundi Congo 2005 9
Teke / Northwestern Bantu, bateke Congo 2005 22, 23
Teke / Northwestern Bantu, bateke Congo 2011 5
Yombe / Central Bantu, bayombe Congo 2005 12
Bembas (Luapula, Lamba, Buye, Kaonde, Lala) DRC Ethnic groups too broad
Kasai (Bunda, Yanzi, Dzing, Sakata, Kuba, Lele) DRC 7 Ethnic groups too broad
Kongos (Sundi, Yombe) DRC Ethnic groups too broad
Kwango (Pende, Suku, Yaka) DRC Ethnic groups too broad
Lunda (Luvale, Ndembu, Chokwe) DRC 8 Ethnic groups too broad
Teke / Northwestern Bantu DRC Ethnic groups too broad
Wodaabe, Bororos DRC Ethnic groups too broad
Mpongwe / Northwestern Bantu Gabon Not listed in DHS
Shogo / Northwestern Bantu Gabon 2000, 2012 6
Teke / Northwestern Bantu Gabon 2000, 2012 3
Twi Akan (Akyem, Anyi, Brong) Ghana 1988 1,2,3
Twi Akan (Akyem, Anyi, Brong) Ghana 1993 1,2,3,4
Twi Akan (Akyem, Anyi, Brong) Ghana 2003, 2008 1
Twi Lagoon (Assini) Ghana 1988 1,2,3
Voltaic people (Lobi, Kulango) Ghana Not listed in DHS
Tenda Guinea Not listed in DHS
Twi Akan (Baule, Anyi, Brong) Cote d’Ivoire 1998 1
101-106,
Twi Akan (Baule, Anyi, Brong) Cote d’Ivoire 2011 108-111,
114
Twi Lagoon (Avikam, Assini) Cote d’Ivoire Not listed in DHS
Voltaic people (Lobi, Kulango) Cote d’Ivoire 1998 5 Variable missing in 1994
Voltaic people (Lobi, Kulango) Cote d’Ivoire 2011 140, 146 Variable missing in 1994
Chewas Malawi 2000, 2004, 2010 1
Nyanja / Maravi Malawi 2010 12
Nyasa / Maravi Malawi Not listed in DHS
Yao Malawi 2000, 2004, 2010 5
Antessar / Tuareg Mali Not listed in DHS
Udalan / Plateu Nigerians - Chadic Mali Not listed in DHS
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Table continued
Ethnic group in Gray (1998) Country Year of Code in Comment
DHS survey DHS survey
Chewas, chichewas Mozambique 2003 10
Chewas, chichewas Mozambique 1997 14
Chewas, chichewas Mozambique 2011 11
Kunda / Maravi Mozambique Not listed in DHS
Makonde / Yao Mozambique 2011 15
Makonde / Yao Mozambique 1997 50
Nyanja / Maravi Mozambique 2003 26
Nyanja / Maravi Mozambique 1997 21
Nyasa / Maravi Mozambique Not listed in DHS
Sena / Maravi, chisena Mozambique 2011 4
Sena / Maravi, chisena Mozambique 2003 5
Sena / Maravi, chisena Mozambique 1997 25
Yao Mozambique 2011 12
Ambo / Southwestern Bantu Namibia 1992 3
Ambo / Southwestern Bantu Namibia 2000 7
Ambo / Southwestern Bantu Namibia 2006 7
Tuareg (Azjer, Ahaggaren, Asben) Niger 1992, 1998 8 Ethnic group variable is missing in 2012 survey
Tuareg (Azjer, Ahaggaren, Asben) Niger 2006 7 Ethnic group variable is missing in 2012 survey
Udalan / Plateu Nigerians - Chadic Niger Not listed in DHS
Daka / Eastern Nigritic Nigeria Ethnic group variable is always missing
Kurama, Gure /Bantoid People Nigeria Ethnic group variable is always missing
Longuda / Eastern Nigritic Nigeria Ethnic group variable is always missing
Ndoro /Bantoid People Nigeria Ethnic group variable is always missing
Tenda Senegal Not listed in DHS
Sherbro / Ku and Peripheral Mande Sierra Leone 2008 16
Fur / Darfur Sudan Ethnic group variable is always missing
Nuba / Nubians (Midobi, Tumtum) Sudan Ethnic group variable is always missing
Makonde / Yao Tanzania Ethnic group variable is always missing
Nyasa / Maravi Tanzania Ethnic group variable is always missing
Ranji / Rift Tanzania Ethnic group variable is always missing
Sagara / Rufiji Tanzania Ethnic group variable is always missing
Zigula (Luguru, Nguru, Kwere) Tanzania Ethnic group variable is always missing
Bemba (Lamba, Lala, Kaonde, Luapula) Zambia 1996, 2001, 2007 1, 2, 3, 26, 27
Bemba (Lamba, Lala, Kaonde, Luapula) Zambia 1992 1
Lunda (Luvale, Ndembu, Luchazi) Zambia Not listed in DHS
Maravi (Chewa, Kunda, Nyanja) Zambia 1996, 2001, 2007 48, 51, 52, 53
Maravi (Chewa, Kunda, Nyanja) Zambia 1992 5
Tonga / Middle Zambesi Bantu Zambia 1992 2
Tonga / Middle Zambesi Bantu Zambia 1996, 2001, 2007 19
Tonga / Middle Zambesi Bantu Zimbabwe Ethnic group variable is always missing
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Table A.3: Number of children and birth spacing, by country
Country Number of Average birth Proportion of short
children intervals (in months) intervals (≤ 24 months)
Benin 6.3 35.5 26.7
Burkina Faso 7.0 34.8 25.4
Burundi 6.9 32.5 32.0
CDR 6.5 34.1 32.3
Cameroon 6.3 34.1 32.9
Centrafrique 6.2 32.9 35.2
Chad 7.2 31.2 35.2
Congo-Brazza 5.2 43.7 21.5
Cote d’ivoire 6.4 37.4 27.6
Egypt 5.3 33.3 40.3
Ethiopia 6.1 34.6 31.1
Gabon 5.5 41.1 29.9
Ghana 5.8 40.0 23.0
Guinee 6.4 37.0 23.5
Kenya 6.5 34.4 34.8
Lesotho 4.5 45.1 16.7
Liberia 6.2 37.2 32.2
Madagascar 6.2 33.8 38.3
Malawi 6.8 34.7 28.7
Mali 7.5 31.9 36.8
Maroc 6.2 33.7 40.1
Mozambique 6.0 36.3 28.2
Namibia 5.1 42.1 25.6
Niger 7.9 30.9 36.7
Nigeria 6.7 33.1 35.3
Rwanda 6.7 33.0 33.2
Senegal 6.7 34.3 30.6
Sierra Leone 5.6 38.6 28.1
South Africa 3.9 48.3 21.8
Sudan 7.6 29.1 45.5
Swaziland 5.5 41.7 26.2
Tanzania 6.6 36.1 26.8
Togo 6.7 35.9 24.8
Tunisia 6.3 29.4 46.9
Uganda 7.4 31.4 37.9
Zambia 7.1 34.4 28.2
Zimbabwe 5.6 40.7 21.3
Total 6.2 34.7 33.0
Weights. The number of children is computed on the sample of women over 40 years old46
Appendix B: Evidence from differential stopping rule
Can we infer the same type of gender preferences by examining only stopping rules, and not
spacing rules? To avoid the issue of censoring, we restrict our sample to women over 40 years old,
and we consider the following linear probability model:
Yn = α0 + α1.F racn + α2.F rac
2
n + θ.Xn
Where Yn equals 0 when women stopped having children at parity n and 1 when women gave birth
to another child ; and Xn remains the same vector of controls (a dummy for each rank and mother’s
characteristics). In Table A.4, we sort the countries according to the same criteria we used in the
duration model. We find evidence of son preference in Egypt, Mozambique and Gabon, daughter
preference in Sudan and preference for variety in Congo DRC, Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia
and Ethiopia. But in the vast majority of countries, we cannot detect any differential stopping rule
depending on the gender composition of previous children.
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Table A.4: Ranking from differential stopping
Country α1 + α2 pvalue of the sum pvalue joint significance
α1 and α2 are jointly significant
Gabon -0.053 0.04 0.10
Egypt -0.035 0.00 0.00
Mozambique -0.032 0.08 0.06
Congo DRC -0.022 0.33 0.05
Guinea -0.017 0.15 0.00
Kenya -0.014 0.24 0.02
Morocco -0.009 0.41 0.00
Namibia 0.010 0.54 0.06
Ethiopia 0.010 0.27 0.02
Sudan 0.047 0.05 0.04
α1 and α2 are not jointly significant
Uganda -0.023 0.07 0.19
Tunisia -0.020 0.36 0.36
Tanzania -0.019 0.15 0.22
Cameroon -0.019 0.17 0.17
South Africa -0.016 0.47 0.35
Swaziland -0.014 0.66 0.47
Lesotho -0.013 0.48 0.48
Burundi -0.012 0.47 0.53
Zimbabwe -0.011 0.38 0.12
Togo -0.007 0.68 0.74
Congo -0.006 0.79 0.94
Rwanda -0.006 0.54 0.62
Madagascar -0.006 0.66 0.80
Burkina Faso -0.005 0.62 0.84
Sierra Leone -0.004 0.87 0.46
Nigeria -0.002 0.85 0.97
Mali 0.000 0.97 0.97
Niger 0.000 1.00 0.99
Chad 0.000 0.98 1.00
Central African Republic 0.003 0.93 0.99
Ghana 0.008 0.52 0.72
Benin 0.008 0.37 0.62
Zambia 0.011 0.42 0.71
Senegal 0.011 0.33 0.36
Malawi 0.017 0.13 0.31
Cote d’Ivoire 0.031 0.14 0.28
Liberia 0.032 0.10 0.11
OLS estimation. Sample: women over 40 years old. Weights. Controls: country, rank of preceding birth, and mother’s characte-
ristics: birth cohort, age at preceding birth, religion, family system, union type, education, wealth, area of residence, employment
status.
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Appendix C: At least one son or more sons?
One may wonder if son preference means that parents want many sons, or that they want at
least one son. In the literature, this interpretation has been called the « funeral pyre » hypothesis,
in reference to the Hindu tradition that requires a son for lighting the funeral pyre of the parents
(Arnold et al., 1998). Similarly, preferences for variety may refer to a preference for at least one child
of each gender, or to a taste for a perfect balance in the gender composition of children. In a low
fertility setting, both interpretations generally coincide. But in our context, it is worth examining
if there are gender preferences above and beyond « having at least one son and/or one daughter ».
In Table A.5, we test if women having at least one child of each gender keep displaying gender
preferences. The answer is positive: the quadratic relationship between the proportion of sons and
the hazard rate still holds. Interestingly, coefficients are even larger in absolute values, meaning that
the magnitude of gender preferences is stronger in the sub-population having at least one son and
one daughter. A tentative explanation is that some people would believe that the probability to give
birth to a boy vs. a girl might vary across couples, and they may try to infer their own probability
from past outcomes. Couples having only sons or only daughters in the past may therefore believe
that they would never have a child of the other sex, and stop accelerating births for another try.
In the end, in such a high fertility setting, son preference means that parents want more sons
than daughters ; and preferences for variety mean that they want the same number of boys and
girls.
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Table A.5: Are there gender preferences beyond « at least one son and/or one daughter »?
Baseline Isolating same-sex siblings
frac(α1) -0.234
∗∗∗
(0.023)
frac2(α2) 0.209
∗∗∗
(0.022)
fraction(λ1) -0.535
∗∗∗
(0.076)
fraction2(λ2) 0.437
∗∗∗
(0.075)
girls -0.096∗∗∗
(0.020)
boys -0.115∗∗∗
(0.020)
(α1 + α2) -0.025***
(λ1 + λ2) -0.098***
Observations 3105217 3105217
Dependent variable: duration between births n and (n + 1). frac: proportion of boys among the previous n children. girls:
previous n children are all girls. boys: previous n children are all boys. fraction is equal to frac iif frac < 1. fraction and
fraction2 capture the impact of the gender composition among women having at least one child of each gender. Cox estimation,
no hazard ratio. Standard errors clustered at the mother level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent
level. *Significant at the 10 percent level. Weights. Controls: country, rank of preceding birth, and mother’s characteristics: birth
cohort, age at preceding birth, religion, family system, union type, education, wealth, area of residence, employment status.
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Appendix D: Full classification
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Table A.6: Which African countries exhibit gender preferences ?
Country α1 + α2 pvalue of the sum pvalue joint significance
α1 and α2 are jointly significant
Egypt -0.168 0.000 0.000
Tunisia -0.099 0.013 0.000
Burundi -0.064 0.022 0.042
Kenya -0.057 0.001 0.000
Uganda -0.055 0.001 0.001
Mali -0.050 0.005 0.000
Mozambique -0.049 0.032 0.040
Morocco -0.048 0.017 0.000
Tanzania -0.038 0.047 0.015
Senegal -0.038 0.018 0.045
Zimbabwe -0.025 0.204 0.021
Rwanda -0.022 0.228 0.000
Guinea -0.017 0.369 0.000
Malawi -0.014 0.389 0.032
Namibia -0.002 0.934 0.097
South Africa 0.004 0.915 0.017
Benin 0.011 0.465 0.000
Ethiopia 0.012 0.516 0.100
Liberia 0.026 0.385 0.062
α1 and α2 are not jointly significant
Swaziland -0.051 0.288 0.366
Gabon -0.019 0.576 0.754
Zambia -0.017 0.338 0.547
Cameroon -0.015 0.422 0.157
Nigeria -0.012 0.500 0.243
Ghana -0.009 0.652 0.673
Madagascar -0.005 0.793 0.157
Burkina Faso -0.002 0.923 0.798
Niger 0.002 0.887 0.569
Congo DRC 0.005 0.894 0.259
Congo 0.010 0.738 0.278
Sierra Leone 0.012 0.745 0.505
Sudan 0.017 0.638 0.713
Lesotho 0.017 0.588 0.682
Togo 0.035 0.226 0.221
Chad 0.035 0.218 0.125
Cote d’Ivoire 0.044 0.112 0.265
Central African Republic 0.055 0.161 0.303
Cox estimation. Weights. Controls: country, rank of preceding birth, and mother’s characteristics: birth cohort, age at preceding
birth, religion, family system, union type, education, wealth, area of residence, employment status. We sort countries by our
indicator of gender preferences (α1 + α2). We report the pvalue of the test (α1 + α2) = 0 and the pvalue of the test for joint
significance of α1 and α2. The table is split in two between countries exhibiting gender preferences and countries with no
preferences.
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Appendix E: Robustness Tests
Figure A.1: (α1 + α2) by birth ranks
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Gender preference by birth ranks - SSA
Order 2 polynomial of child’s birth rank with 5% confidence intervals. Cox estimation. Standard errors
clustered at the mother level. Weights. Controls: country and mother’s characteristics: birth cohort, age at
preceding birth, religion, family system, union type, education, wealth, area of residence, employment status.
Beware that the scale is not the same in the two graphs.
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Table A.7: Is our indicator driven by the gender of the nth birth in North Africa?
Sample Baseline Decomposition Decomposition, by rank
fracn -0.795***
(0.034)
frac2n 0.654***
(0.032)
fracn−1 -0.467*** -0.466***
(0.038) (0.039)
frac2n−1 0.342*** 0.340***
(0.037) (0.037)
Boyn -0.123*** -0.106***
(0.006) (0.011)
Boy ×Rank3 -0.039**
(0.017)
Boy ×Rank4 -0.046**
(0.018)
Boy ×Rank5 -0.026
(0.021)
Boy ×Rank6 0.007
(0.024)
Boy ×Rank7 -0.019
(0.029)
Boy ×Rank8 0.024
(0.037)
(α1 + α2) -0.141*** -0.125*** -0.126***
Observations 385180 286264 274358
Dependent variable: duration between births n and (n + 1). fracn: proportion of boys among the previous n children. Boyn:
dummy for birth n is a boy. Sample: North Africa (Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia). In columns 2 and 3, we exclude durations
after birth 1 because fracn−1 is not defined at that parity. In column 3, we exclude birth orders higher than 8 to have enough
observations in each cell by birth order ; the birth order of reference is 2. Cox estimation, no hazard ratio. Standard errors
clustered at the mother level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10
percent level. Weights. Controls: country, rank of preceding birth, and mother’s characteristics: birth cohort, age at preceding
birth, religion, family system, union type, education, wealth, area of residence, employment status.
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Table A.8: Testing the mortality bias
Baseline Test
frac(α1) -0.234
∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.025)
frac2(α2) 0.209
∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.024)
dead child 0.009
(0.016)
frac × dead child 0.257∗∗∗
(0.059)
frac2 × dead child -0.236∗∗∗
(0.054)
(α1 + α2) -0.025
∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
Observations 3105217 3105217
Dependent variable: duration between births n and (n+1). frac: proportion of boys among the previous n children. dead child:
dummy for at least one dead child among the previous n children. Cox estimation, no hazard ratio. Standard errors clustered at
the mother level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent level.
Weights. Controls: country, rank of preceding birth, and mother’s characteristics: birth cohort, age at preceding birth, religion,
family system, union type, education, wealth, area of residence, employment status.
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Table A.9: Testing the mortality bias – by groups of countries
Preference for variety Son preference
Baseline Test Baseline Test
frac(α1) -0.200
∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.055) (0.023) (0.025)
frac2(α2) 0.203
∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.053) (0.022) (0.024)
dead child 0.025 -0.035∗∗
(0.034) (0.016)
frac × dead child -0.174 0.704∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.062)
frac2 × dead child 0.210∗ -0.693∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.058)
(α1 + α2) 0.003 -0.003 -0.078
∗∗∗ -0.079 ∗∗∗
Observations 773577 773577 1167669 1167669
Dependent variable: duration between births n and (n+1). frac: proportion of boys among the previous n children. dead child:
dummy for at least one dead child among the previous n children. Cox estimation, no hazard ratio. Standard errors clustered
at the mother level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent
level. Weights. Controls: country, rank of preceding birth, and mother’s characteristics: birth cohort, age at preceding birth,
religion, family system, union type, education, wealth, area of residence, employment status. Countries in group « Preference
for variety »: Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Guinea, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Benin, Ethiopia and Liberia. Countries in group
« Son preference »: Egypt, Tunisia, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Mali, Mozambique, Morocco, Tanzania and Senegal.
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Appendix F: In which countries does the gender composition of the
first two children predict subsequent fertility choices?
One extension of our analysis is to consider the gender composition of previous children as
an instrument for future fertility choices in order to estimate the impact of fertility on another
outcome. In which African countries are gender preferences strong enough for the first stage to
hold? We examine the situation after the second birth. Since Fracn is not at all continuous when
n = 2, we estimate an alternative proportional hazard model:
λ(t) = λ0(t)× exp(βgirls.Girls+ βboys.Boys+ θ.X2)
Where Girls is a dummy equal to 1 if the first two children are girls, Boys is a dummy equal
to 1 if the first two children are boys. We do not reweigh the observations here, because the unit
of observation is the mother. Robust standard errors are clustered at the finest geographical level
defined in DHS (DHS cluster). Women having exactly 1 boy and 1 girl are the reference category. If
βgirls > 0 and βboys > 0, there is evidence of a taste for balance, because the lowest hazard rate –
hence the longest expected interval before the third birth – is reached by women having children
of both sex. Then, from the relative values of βboys and βgirls, we can infer the existence of son or
daughter preference.
Not surprisingly, the gender composition of the first two children is a strong predictor of next
birth spacing in North Africa: Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt systematically display a strong son
preference. Couples in Mali, Nigeria and Zimbabwe also wait significantly less before the third birth
when they have at first two daughters vs. two sons. Then, the instrument would work in Benin,
Guinea, Rwanda, Malawi and South Africa: they exhibit preferences for variety. Interestingly, some
countries display daughter preference after the second birth: Ethiopia, Namibia, and Cote d’Ivoire.
But in the vast majority of countries, the gender composition of the first two children does not
influence the duration before third birth.
How to explain the discrepancy between the classification mentioned above and the one illus-
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trated in Figure 3? When we use only intervals after the second birth, we lose some power to detect
small magnitudes, as compared to the specification exploiting all parities. Mechanically, there are
more countries in which we find no evidence of gender preferences at rank 2. Furthermore, as shown
in section 5.3, the impact of gender preferences is weaker at rank 2 than at higher ranks. However,
two specific cases are worth mentioning: in Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire, gender preferences (respec-
tively, son preference and daughter preference) are significant at rank 2 but disappear at higher
ranks.
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